Human-subject experiments using markets with asymmetric information typically exhibit a "winner's curse", where bidders systematically bid more than their optimal amount. The winner's curse is very persistent; even when subjects are able to make decisions repeatedly in the same situation, they repeatedly overbid. Why do people keep making the same mistakes over and over again? We consider a class of one-player decision problems which generalize Akerlof's (1970) market-for-lemons model. We show that if decision makers learn via reinforcement, specifically by the reference point model of Erev and Roth (1996) , their behavior typically changes very slowly, and persistent mistakes are likely. We also develop testable predictions regarding when individuals ought to be able to learn more quickly.
Introduction
In a seminal theoretical paper, Akerlof (1970) argues that when asymmetric information is present in market settings, rational buyers lower their bids (that is, their willingness to pay), resulting in a suboptimal number of exchanges: market failure. But a robust result in human-subject experiments using environments such as his "lemons market" is that market failure generally does not result. Rather, subjects in the role of potential buyers persistently overbid, even when they have the opportunity to learn by making decisions repeatedly in the same situation. While overbidding increases the likelihood of transactions occurring, resulting in less market failure than predicted, the subjects/bidders often earn much less money than they would have by never bidding at all-in many cases, losing money. Examples of this "winner's curse" in asymmetric-information market settings include Ball (1991) , Ball, Bazerman, and Carroll (1991) , Cifuentes and Sunder (1991) , and Holt and Sherman (1994) . 1 (Holt and Sherman additionally consider a "loser's curse" decision problem, in which subjects underbid.)
Why do subjects take so long to figure out this problem? It could be argued that naive behavior might cause initial bidders' choices to diverge substantially from optimal play, but this doesn't explain why this divergence persists. One possible explanation for the slowness of learning in these situations is that subjects are learning via reinforcement. According to models of reinforcement learning, agents learn over time to play successful actions more often relative to unsuccessful actions. 2 However, reinforcement learning in these situations can be slow; according to such models, behavior changes very little when an agent's bid is rejected. Also, learning is noisy; it sometimes happens that a bad action yields a high realized payoff, so that the bad action becomes more likely in the future rather than less.
In this paper, we will consider a class of one-player decision problems which are a generalization of Akerlof's market-for-lemons model. We show that if decision makers learn via a particular reinforcement-based learning model (specifically, the reference point model of Erev and Roth (1996) ), their behavior changes very slowly, and repeated mistakes are likely. We also develop testable predictions regarding which decision problems in this class have optima that can be learned relatively quickly.
The Decision Problem
The decision problems we consider are based on a class of two-player asymmetric-information market games, similar to those studied by Akerlof (1970) . The players are a bidder and a seller.
1 Kagel (1995) discusses the winner's curse in the related setting of common-value auctions, where it was first discovered.
2 Roth and Erev's (1995) model was the first reinforcement model used to describe behavior in economic experiments. In Section 2.2, we will consider a more complicated reinforcement model, which they introduced in a follow-up paper (Erev and Roth (1996) ).
The seller has possession of a single unit of an indivisible good. This good has value v > 0 to the seller and value λv to the bidder, where 1 < λ < 2. The good is therefore worth more to the bidder than to the seller, regardless of what v actually is, and both bidder and seller know this. Only the seller knows the true value of v, however; the bidder knows only that v is distributed uniformly over the set V = {x 0 , x 0 + 1, x 0 + 2, x 0 + 3, ..., x 0 + 9}. The bidder makes a bid b ∈ V to the seller, which the seller may accept or reject. If the seller accepts the bidder's bid, the bidder pays the seller b in exchange for the good. If the seller rejects the bidder's bid, the seller keeps the good and no money changes hands. In either case, the game ends at this point.
In order to concentrate on bidder behavior, we reduce this game into a one-person decision problem by modeling the seller as an automaton which accepts the bidder's bid if and only if the bid is at least as large as its (the seller's) valuation, i.e., if and only if b ≥ v. This is how a rational seller would behave (that is, such behavior constitutes a weakly dominant strategy for the seller), so optimal bidder behavior in this reduced decision problem corresponds to sequential equilibrium (the standard game-theoretic solution concept for games of this type) in the original game. 3 , and since she receives zero profit if her bid is rejected, her unconditional expected profit (given b) is
Optimal bidder Behavior
The optimal choice of b depends on the values of the parameters x 0 and λ. The best-known variation has x 0 = 0. This gives rise to a "winner's curse" situation, like those by, e.g., Ball (1991) and Ball, Bazerman, and Carroll (1991) . The optimal bid is b = x 0 = 0, the lowest possible bid. Two other versions of interest use λ = 1.5 and x 0 = either 10 or 5. When x 0 = 10, the unique optimal bid is b = 19, the highest possible bid. When x 0 = 5, there are two optimal bids: b = 9 or b = 10. Following Holt and Sherman (1994) , we will refer to these games as a "loser's curse" and a "no curse" decision problem, in contrast to the winner's curse problem with x 0 = 0.
3 This assumption about seller behavior also implies that limiting bidder's bids to elements of V is not a severe restriction. Given this seller behavior, any bid b > x0 + 9 is dominated by a bid of exactly x0 + 9, as both are always accepted, but the latter pays more. Any bid b ∈ (x0 + k, x0 + k + 1), for k = 0, 2, ..., 8, is dominated by a bid of exactly x0 + k, as one is accepted if and only if the other is, and the latter pays more. Any bid b < x0 is never accepted, thus paying zero with certainty, and is therefore dominated by a bid of exactly x0, which pays zero unless it is accepted (with probability 0.1), in which case it gives a positive payoff. Therefore, any bid outside V is dominated by some bid in V .
As mentioned in the introduction, there have been several experimental studies of decision problems and games of this type. When all of these studies are considered, the main result is that optimal behavior has very little descriptive power. When the equilibrium prediction is the lowest possible bid, the overwhelming majority of subjects overbid, and the average bid tends to lie near the unconditional average seller value. This tendency is unaffected by replacing "realistic" instructions (in which subjects are told, for example, that they represent an acquiring firm, considering taking over a target firm) with context-free instructions (Ball (1991) , (Cifuentes and Sunder (1991) ). Overbidding decreases only slightly when subjects are allowed to play repeatedly (Ball, Bazerman, and Carroll (1991) , Cifuentes and Sunder (1991) ).
It is easy to understand why inexperienced bidders might perform badly in this situation. When assessing the expected payoff to each of their possible bids, they must calculate the probability of the bid being accepted and the expected payoff contingent on the bid being accepted (the expected payoff contingent on the bid being rejected is zero). The latter is a difficult cognitive task for most non-mathematicians; bidders must understand how this depends on the bid, and that the distribution of possible sellers' values given that the bid is accepted is truncated from above by the bid itself. Failure to take this truncation into account (that is, mistakenly considering the ex post distribution of sellers' values to be the unconditional distribution-uniform over V ) may result in overbidding (the winner's curse) or underbidding (the loser's curse). Holt and Sherman (1994) design an experiment which compares subject behavior in "winner's curse," "loser's curse," and "no curse" games. Besides optimal behavior (which they refer to as "rational bidding"), they consider a "naive model" in which bidders mistakenly ignore the truncation, as discussed above. They find that the naive model, which predicts higher-than-optimal bids in their winner's curse condition, lower-than-optimal bids in their loser's curse condition, and optimal bids in their no curse condition, describes subject behavior better than rational bidding does.
The Learning Model
Holt and Sherman's naive model accurately predicts the divergence between optimal and actual behavior in their experiment; however, they did not examine how behavior might change as subjects became more experienced. As mentioned above, some learning typically occurs, but the tendency toward optimal behavior is very slight. One reason for the failure of subjects in these experiments to play optimally might be that they are learning via reinforcement. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the optimal choice for bidders in the "winner's curse" game is a bid of 0, the lowest bid possible. However, this bid is guaranteed to earn zero, regardless of whether it is accepted or rejected, so that it may not be substantially reinforced. Higher bids perform worse in expected value terms, but sometimes earn positive payoffs. A bid of 9 can possibly result in a payoff of 9(λ − 1), if the seller's value turns out to be 9 also. If there happen to be a few high seller values early in an experiment, subjects may incorrectly "learn" to choose high bids rather than higher-expected-value-earning low bids; such learning disappears only slowly.
The learning model is based on the adjustible-reference-point reinforcement-learning model of Erev and Roth (1996) . 4 This model has two features which make it useful for modeling subject behavior in individual decision-making problems such as lemons experiments. First, because it is a model of bounded rationality, rather than perfect rationality, it allows for the possibility that subjects make suboptimal decisions, possibly for long lengths of time. Second, reinforcement models allow learning (in the sense of changes in the likelihood of different actions) to occur in an individual decision problem. Choices that have led to better outcomes in the past become more likely to be chosen in the future. (This is the Law of Effect, which dates back at least to Thorndike (1898) .) Not all learning models have these advantages. Fictitious play (Robinson (1951) ), probably the bestknown beliefs-based model, requires subjects in decision problems to choose their optimal strategy with probability one. 5 (They can make suboptimal choices in multi-player situations, if they have incorrect beliefs about the likely behavior of the other players.) Stochastic beliefs-based models such as "cautious fictitious play" (Fudenberg and Levine (1998) ), while allowing for suboptimal play in decision-making problems, do not allow the frequency of such play to change over time. 6
The learning model we use has the following form; we attempt to conform as closely as possible to Erev and Roth's (1996) parameterization, as they have shown it to characterize subject behavior well in experiments involving many different decision-making situations. In round t ≥ 0 and for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 9}, the n-th player has a nonnegative propensity q t n (k) to choose the pure strategy k (which corresponds to a bid of x 0 + k). The sum of these propensities is her strength of propensities in round t:
Her mixed strategy in round t is such that the probability of her choosing strategy k is proportional to the propensity:
4 See their paper for a more detailed description of the model. 5 Beliefs-based models assume that individuals form beliefs about aspects of their situation, which are updated in response to new information about the situation, and actions are chosen based on how well they are expected to do, given the individual's beliefs. In strategic situations involving more than one decision maker, beliefs usually concern the likely play of the other decision makers. In single-person decision problems like this one, it is less clear what beliefs should be about. Reinforcement models do not require beliefs; rather, it is the likelihood of choosing each action that is updated in response to new information. 6 Camerer and Ho's (1999) "experience-weighted attraction" combines elements of reinforcement and beliefsbased learning. Like the reinforcement model we use, it allows suboptimal play and satisfies the Law of Effect, as well as the Power Law of Practice (Blackburn (1936) ), according to which learning slows down as more experience is accumulated. We expect that experience-weighted attraction would also be a good choice for modeling learning in the decision-making problems discussed here.
The payoff player n receives in round t depends on the pure strategy she actually chooses, which determines her bid, and on the seller's realized value:
The payoff is used to update the bidder's propensities. First, her payoff is compared to her reference point ρ t n (which can be thought of as an "aspiration level" for payoffs); then, her propensities are reinforced (augmented) by this difference. Most of the reinforcement is of the action that was played, but a small portion is added to actions adjacent to the one that was played, reflecting a tendency to experiment with strategies that are similar to successful strategies:
where M is the number of strategies adjacent to k. (M is equal to 1 for k = 0 and k = 9, and 2 for all other k.) The value of ∈ [0, 1) quantifies the amount of experimentation; it is meant to be positive but close to zero. The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1) reflects "gradual forgetting" (or "recency") by the individual. Over time, strategies that have recently performed well become more likely relative to those that performed well long ago. The reference point ρ t n can change over time. Following Erev and Roth, we set its initial value to (λ − 1)x 0 − 9, the minimum possible payoff. It is updated each round based on the relationship between the previous reference point and the payoff for the round:
where the parameters w + and w − represent the weights assigned to reinforcements following betterthan-expected and worse-than-expected outcomes, respectively. The learning model therefore has five free parameters: , δ, w + , w − , and Q 1 n (the strength of initial propensities).
Simulation Design and Results
In order to see the implications of the learning model, we simulated experiments based on our "winner's curse," "loser's curse," and "no curse" games. As mentioned earlier, sellers were programmed to always accept bids greater than or equal to their valuations. Bidders were programmed to act according to the learning model described in Section 2.2. Learning model parameter values are shown in Table 1 ; these were chosen so as to conform as closely as possible to those used by Erev and Roth. The strength of initial propensities was (λ − 1)x 0 (roughly the average magnitude of payoffs) in some simulations, and 3(λ − 1)x 0 in others. Since higher strengths of propensities mean that probabilities change less in response to a given reinforcement, learning should be faster in the former case, slower in the latter. The strength of initial propensities is divided equally among the initial propensities for the ten strategies, so that subjects begin the simulation choosing each strategy with equal likelihood. (This leads to initial behavior similar on average to that predicted by Holt and Sherman's naive model.) The larger value for w − than w + reflects loss aversion, the phenomenon where an outcome viewed as a loss affects behavior more than a same-sized gain would have (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ). Four sets of simulations were performed, with varying values of x 0 and λ. A simulation consisted of 500 bidders, each playing a version of the game for 500 rounds. In two sets of simulations, the value of x 0 was fixed at zero, and the value of λ was allowed to vary between 1 and 2. These are winner's-curse environments, in which the unique optimal bid is zero; however, the penalty for suboptimal bids is lower for higher values of λ. (Therefore, learning should be faster when λ is lower.) In the other two sets of simulations, the value of λ was fixed at 1.5, and the value of x 0 was allowed to take values of 0, 5, and 10. These values lead to winner's-curse, loser's-curse, and no-curse environments, respectively. Within each environment, we ran sets of simulations with both (λ − 1)x 0 (faster learning) and 3(λ − 1)x 0 (slower learning). Within a set of simulations, the distribution of the seller's value was independently and identically distributed across all rounds and bidder-seller pairs. The horizontal axis shows the round, and the vertical axis shows the excess of average bids over the minimum value x 0 (so that simulation results with different values of x 0 can be compared). Recall that the optimal bid is the lowest possible bid in the winner's-curse environment, the highest possible bid in the loser's-curse environment, and one of the two midrange bids in the no-curse environment.
Comparing either panel of Figure 1 to the corresponding panel of Figure 2 , we see that tripling the strength of initial propensities does indeed slow learning, but the effect is small, to the point where we can say that simulation trajectories are qualitatively the same in the figures. We can see from either figure that changing the value of either λ or x 0 affects the results more substantially. Increasing λ in the winner's-curse environment (left panel) slows convergence to equilibrium, as expected. However, convergence is slow for all values of λ, even the lowest (λ = 1.01). In both slow-and fast-learning simulations, even after 500 rounds, average bids are above $2.50 (compared to zero in equilibrium). When λ = 1.75, average bids take almost 500 rounds to fall from $4.50 to $4.00, and when λ = 1.99, expected bids stay essentially constant over the 500 rounds. Over the first 20 rounds, a typical length for a human-subjects experiment, average bids fall by less than 50 cents.
Changing x 0 -that is, going from winner's curse to no curse to loser's curse (right panel)-changes the simulation trajectories qualitatively. Average bids in the winner's curse (x 0 = 0) treatment move slowly downward, while they increase in the loser's curse (x 0 = 10) treatment; in both cases, the movement is in the direction of optimal play, though play is still far from optimal after 500 rounds. The speed with which average bids change is substantially higher in the loser's curse treatment than in the winner's curse treatment, which is notable because they used the same value of λ. That is, raising x 0 from 5 to 10 seems to have more effect on learning speed than an equal lowering of x 0 , from 5 to 0.
Conclusion
The main results of these simulations is that average bids tend to move over time in the direction of optimal choices, but they move quite slowly. This result is in keeping with the experimental results discussed in Section 2.1, so one could argue that the reinforcement learning model does a good job of describing at least the major features of subject behavior in these lemons-market experiments. In order to better understand the descriptive ability of this model, it is useful to compare simulations with different parameters. The results of simulations with varying values of λ imply that reducing λ leads to faster movement toward optimal play. The results of simulations with varying values of x 0 imply that loser's curse experiments might show faster movement toward optimal play than winner's curse experiments. Both implications suggest future treatments for lemons-market experiments; such experiments would not only further test the ability of this model to describe individual behavior, but also shed some more light on the reasons for persistent irrational behavior in these settings and others.
